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MODERN AND ANCIENT LEGAL PRAGMATISMJOHN DEWEY & CO. VS. ARISTOTLE:* I
I.
OHN DEWEY is rightly hailed today as America's most
influential philosopher.' Whether or not one agrees with
critics who say that he has overstressed the practical,2 I
believe it undeniable that his thinking about thinking has
had immensely valuable effects on thinking in many fields.
His outstanding thesis, to state it crudely, has been that all
generalizations-all theories, principles, rules-should be
tested by observing how they work in practice. Leading
The following pages contain a stimulating article by Judge Jerome Frank
of the United States Court of Appeals. Judge Frank, while admittedly not a
Thomist, has, nevertheless, often proclaimed his deep interest in, and sympathy
for, the fundamental moral postulates of Scholastic Natural Law. Those members of the various schools of Jurisprudence who, while not rejecting the principles of justice as the basis for legal order, do wish to see them applied to concrete cases rather than hang impotent in a vacuum, may find that Judge Frank's
article suggests at least one mutual meeting ground for them. Certainly all
those lawyers and philosophers who wish to show, or have it be shown, that
moral principles have significance beyond the preserves of the academician will
welcome this attempt by Judge Frank to focus attention on the fact-finding

processes of our judicial system.-The editors.
*In part, this paper includes some matter already treated in my book, FRAax,
COURTS or TRrA_ (1949). But here I have enlarged on themes which there
I dealt with merely in passing, i., the unpragmatic attitude of some of the
legal Deweyites, the pragmatic attributes of Aristotle, and Dewey's deficiencies
as a legal pragmatist.
1 The following remarks were made on the occasion of Dewey's ninetieth
birthday: "His pre-eminence among American philosophers," writes Ralph Barton
Perry, "is undisputed even by those who, believing that he is often an exponent
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legal thinkers in particular have often quoted with approval
his theory about the relations of theory and practice. Those
thinkers, in turn, have influenced many other legal thinkers
who have exploited Dewey's insights, often without acknowledgement or knowledge of their debt to him.
Now in our judicial system, we allot to our trial courts the
greater part of the job of putting to practical use the legal
generalizations-i.e., the legal rules and principles. For in
perhaps more than ninety per cent of all lawsuits, the trial
court decisions are not appealed; and, of the few appealed
trial court decisions, probably the majority are affirmed.
Therefore, if (as I shall try to show) the trial courts differ,
and must differ, most substantially from the upper courts in
the ways in which they practically operate the legal generalizations-the legal rules and principles-the following, to
anyone who even half-agrees with Dewey, is an almost certain result: A person who has not observed, or otherwise
learned a good deal about, trials and trial courts will be ignorant concerning much of the practical operations of those
legal rules and principles; he wl, accordingly, have a considerable fund of ignorance concerning those rules and
principles.
Ironically, Dewey's own acquaintance with our judicial
system was obtained from men who had little or no knowledge of trial court activities, or who, in their writings, disregarded those activities. It is equally ironic that most
(not all) of the legal thinkers whom Dewey has influenced
have similarly lacked knowledge of or interest in trial court
doings. As a consequence, among legal thinkers, Dewey's
of error, have difficulty in accounting for him." "And whatever may be the
criticism of his pragmatism," says President Seymour of Yale, "he is recognized
even by his opponents as America's greatest living philosopher." Meiklejohn
comments: "Mr. Dewey is, in my opinion, the most influential thinker of our
time and our nation. . . . "

See New Republic, Oct. 17, 1949, pp. 11, 16, 22.

2 1 happen to believe that those critics have been unfair to Dewey, that
they have read some of his statements out of context, and that they have
identified Dewey with some of his more glib, dogmatic disciples.
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pragmatic counsels have been acclaimed chiefly by those
who, for the most part, have not heeded those counsels, and
who, accordingly, have been guilty of the very kind of errors
-resulting from a snobbish shunning of much of the practical-which, in other fields, Dewey has tirelessly exposed.
I refer to such lawyer-disciples of Dewey as Walter Wheeler
Cook, Karl Llewellyn, Edwin Patterson and Benjamin Cardozo.
IL.
Before discussing their views, it will be helpful to note
some of Dewey's statements about the relations of theory
and practice. Many such statements occur in his book, The
Quest for Certainty.3 There he deplores "the disesteem in
which the idea of practice has been held," the "depreciation
of action," the "disrepute which has attended... everything
associated with practice," the "disparaging view of practice
and the exalted view of knowledge apart from action." He
aims at the "destruction of the barriers which have divided
theory and practice." He says: 4
The active power of ideas is a reality, but ideas and idealisms have an operative force in concrete experienced situations;
their worth has to be tested by the specified consequences of
their operation . . . Ideas and idealisms are in themselves

hypotheses not finalities. Being connected with operations to
be performed, they are tested by the consequences of those
operations, not by what exists prior to them....
Ideas that are plans of operations to be performed, are integral factors in actions 'which change the face of the world.
Idealistic philosophies have not been wrong in attaching vast
importance and power to ideas. But in isolating their function and their test from action, they failed to grasp the point

and place where ideas have a constructive office. A genuine
idealism and one compatible with science will emerge as soon
as philosophy accepts the teaching of science that ideas are
statements not of what is or has been but of acts to be per-

formed.

For then mankind will learn that, intellectually

(that is, save for the esthetic enjoyment they afford, which
3
4

DEw Y, TEE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY (1929).
Id. at 167, 138, 279-80, 281, 284.
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is of course a true value), ideas are worthless except as they
pass into actions which rearrange and reconstruct in some
way, be it little or large, the world in which we live. To
magnify thought and ideas for their own sake apart from what
they do (except, once more, esthetically) is to refuse to learn
the lesson of the most authentic kind of knowledge-the experimental-and it is to reject the idealism which involves responsibility. To praise thinking above action because there
is so much ill-considered action in the world is to help maintain the kind of a world in which action occurs for narrow
and transient purposes. To seek after ideas and to cling to
them as means of conducting operations, as factors in practical arts, is to participate in creating a world in which the
springs of thinking will be clear and over-flowing....
It is impossible to form a just estimate of the paralysis of
effort that has been produced by indifference to means. Logically, it is truistic that lack of consideration for means signifies that so-called ends are not taken seriously. It is as if one
professed devotion to painting pictures conjoined with contempt for canvas, brush and paints; or love of music on condition that no instruments, whether the voice or something
external, be used to make sounds. The good workman in
the arts is known by his respect for his tools and by his interest in perfecting his technique. The glorification in the arts
of ends at the expense of means would be taken to be a sign
of complete insincerity or even insanity. Ends separated
from means are either sentimental indulgences or if they happen to exist are merely accidental. The ineffectiveness in action of "ideals" is due precisely to the supposition that means
and ends are not on exactly the same level with respect to
the attention and care they demand.
It is, however, much easier to point out the formal contradiction implied in ideals that are professed without equal regard for the instruments and techniques of their realization,
than it is to appreciate the concrete ways in which belief in
their separation has found its way into life and borne corrupt
and poisonous fruits. The separation marks the form in
which the traditional divorce of theory and practice has expressed itself in actual life. It accounts for the relative impotency of arts concerned with enduring human welfare.
Sentimental attachment and subjective eulogy take the place
of action ....
Theory separated from concrete doing and making is
empty and futile; practice then becomes an immediate seizure
of opportunities and enjoyments which conditions afford with-
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out the direction which theory-knowledge and ideas-has
power to supply. The problem of the relation of theory and
practice is not a problem of theory alone; it is that, but it
is also the most practical problem of life. For it is the question of how intelligence may inform action, and how action
may bear the fruit of increased insight into meaning: a clear
view of the values that are worth while and of the means by
which they are to be made secure in experienced objects.
Construction of ideals in general and their sentimental glorification are easy; the responsibilities both of studious thought
and of action are shirked ....
The primary problem for thinking which lays claim to be
philosophic in its breadth and depth is to assist in bringing
about a reconstruction of all beliefs rooted in a basic separation of knowledge and action; to develop a system of operative
ideas congruous with present knowledge and with present facilities of control over natural events and energies . . . But

while the solution cannot be found in "thought" alone, it can
be furthered by thinking which is operative-which frames
and defines ideas in terms of what may be done....

In Essays in Experimental Logic, Dewey wrote:
Science has advanced in its methods in just the degree in
which it has ceased to assume that prior realities and prior
meanings retain fixedly and finally, when entering into reflective situations, the characters they had prior to this entrance,
and in which it has realized that their very presence within
the knowledge situation signifies -that they have to be redefined and revalued from the standpoint of the new situation.

Finally, in a specific discussion of the "logic of judicial
decisions," Dewey scored the "failure to recognize that general legal rules and principles are working hypotheses, needing to be constantly tested by the way in which they work
out in application to concrete situations. . . ." I He urged
the courts to "trust to an experimental logic" in which "general principles emerge as statements of generic ways in which
it has been found helpful to treat concrete cases." He agreed
with Holmes whose position he summed up as a protest
against the sort of legal logic which adhered to "formal conDEWEY, EssAYs neTEXpERIMENTAL LoGIc 244 (1916).
6 Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CoRN. L. Q. 17, 26 (1924).

5
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sistency, consistency.of concepts with one another, irrespective of the consequences of their application to concrete
matters-of-fact."
Now let us turn to some of Dewey's leading legal disciples
and see how they have dealt with his ideas of theory and
practice.
III.
Some Notable Legal Deweyites
1.

Professor Walter Wheeler Cook:

In 1933, Cook published a brilliant article I containing
ideas which still have important repercussions. There Cook,
a propos of legal rules, said, quoting Dewey,8 that: I
...whatever else they may be, generalizations are not "fixed
rules for deciding doubtful cases, but instrumentalities for
their investigation, methods by which the net value of past
experience is rendered available for present scrutiny of new
perplexities ...

they are hypotheses to be tested and revised

by their further working... To call a generalization a tool
is not to say it is useless; the contrary is patently the case.
A tool is something to use. Hence it is something to be improved by noting how it works."
Cook, in that article, set out to show how courts "work"
such legal tools, i.e., how they use legal rules in applying
them to the facts of particular lawsuits. But he wrote as if
those rules worked in the same way in upper and lower
courts. To be sure, at one point,"° he frankly indicated in a
footnote that there was a significant difference but that he
had deliberately ignored it. This footnote appears in the
following context: Cook had defined a "legal right" as but
a prophecy that, if a person claims that another person
should act in a certain way, and "if the one claiming the
'right' appeals in the proper way to the proper officials...
7

Cook, "Substance and "Procedure" in the Conflict of Laws, 42

L. 3. 333 (1933).
8 DEwzv, Humm NATURE AND CoNnuCT 240, 245 (1922).

9 Cook, supra note 7, at 358.
10 Id. at 348.

YAME
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these officials will bring the public force to bear upon the
defendant." 11 To that statement, Cook appended this footnote: "Of course, all statements as short as this oversimplify and tend to ignore the fact that if the case is contested
one can never be sure, for example, what verdict the jury
may bring in, etc. For the purposes of the present paper,
this always present uncertainty is not of importance." 12
Yet in no other of his writings did Cook discuss that "always present uncertainty"-an uncertainty which inheres in
most trials and which is a result of a virtually unique function of trial courts, whether or not there is trial by jury.
The Trial Court's Unique Function:
For a trial court, as its name implies, conducts trials of
lawsuits; an upper court does not. At most trials, witnesses appear in the trial courtroom and orally tell their stories;
and usually the stories told by some of the witnesses contradict those told by some of the other witnesses. Scarcely
ever do witnesses appear before, and narrate their tales to,
an upper court. A trial court, by accepting as true one or
other of the witnesses' stories, must determine the "facts,"
as best it can, i.e., must determine what were the eventsas they actually happened in the past-which gave rise to
the suit. What legal rule should properly be applied in deciding the controversy ordinarily depends upon the "facts"
as they are, in that and no other way, determined by the
trial court.
The TrialCourt's "Sovereignty":
Tbalt phase of "fact-finding"--that phase which pertains
to passing upon the credibility (reliability) of oral testimony
-is almost always outside the province of an upper court.
Why? Because the observed demeanor of witnesses is
11

Cook was here expanding Holmes' well-known definition of a "legal

right."
12 I incline to believe that some correspondence, in 1932, between Cook
and me about his and my previous writings explained the inclusion of this
footnote: It was, I think, Cook's concession to my criticism.
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thought (and with some reason) to supply invaluable clues
to their credibility.1" I recently said, speaking for our
court, that: "4
. . . the demeanor of an orally-testifying witness is "always
assumed to be in evidence." It is "wordless language." The
liar's story may seem uncontradicted to one who merely reads
it, yet it may be "contradicted" in the trial court by his manner, his intonations, his grimaces, his gestures, and the like
-all matters which "cold print does not preserve" and which
constitute "lost evidence" so far as an upper court is concerned. For such a court, it has been said, even if it were
called a "rehearing court," is not a "reseeing court." Only
were we to have "talking movies" of trials could it be otherwise . . . Without doubt, the result of our procedure is to

vest the trial judge with immense power not subject to correction even if misused: His estimate of an orally-testifying
witness' credibility may stem from the trial judge's application of an absurd rule-of-thumb, such as that when a witness
wipes his hands during his testimony, unquestionably he is
lying; 15 but, unless the judge reveals of record that he used
such an irrational test of credibility, an upper court can do

nothing to correct his error. We thus have what Tourt6ulon
called the "sovereignty" of the trial judge. 16

Fact Discretion:
Another name for the trial court's "sovereignty" is "discretion." However, altogether too many legal thinkers 11
write as if there existed no judicial discretion other than
rule-discretion, i.e., the wide scope allowed to a judge by
13 Those clues, as the psychologists have demonstrated, are by no means
infallible. However, with our present trial techniques, they do throw more light
on credibility than the words of witnesses as they appear in print or writing.
14 Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp., 175 F. (2d)

77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949).

15 See Quercia v. United States, 289 U. S. 466, 468, 53 S. Ct. 790, 77 L. Ed.
1321 (1932).
16 See TouRTou~oN, Pmnrosopuy mn THE DEVELOPMENT oF LAw 396 (Read's
trans. 1922).
There is much less of such "sovereignty" when none of the testimony is oral
or when documentary evidence is such as to render the oral testimony patently
incredible. Cf. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 68 S. Ct.
525, 92 L. Ed. 746 (1949).
17
Cardozo is typical. See Frank, Cardozo and The Upper-Court Myth,
13 LAw & CoNaTap. PRoB. 369, 377-78 (1448); FRANK, CouRas ON TRALr 56-58
(1949).
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some flexible substantive rules in applying those rules to particular facts. But the trial court has another kind of discretion-fact-discretion-which exists no matter how inflexible
the applicable substantive rules appear to be, i.e., the power
to choose which witnesses' stories are to be accepted as correct. 8 Usually such fact-discretion, when the testimony is
oral and in conflict, is virtually absolute, largely uncontrollable by upper courts.
This virtually uncontrollable fact-discretion it is that renders the trial courts the most important and powerful part
of the judicial system, generally far more important and
powerful than the upper courts: This fact-discretioi of the
trial court provides the principal explanation of -the fewness
of appeals from trial court decisions; it also explains the
large number of affirmances of appealed'decisions.
The "Always Present Uncertainty":
Not only is this trial court "sovereignty" largely beyond
control, but its exercise by a trial court in any particular
lawsuit, before that suit is begun or tried, is ordinarily not
foreseeable. As a consequence, this "sovereignty"--not
any lack of exactness or stability in the legal rules-is responsible for the greater part of legal uncertainty, i.e., the
inability to predict the decisions of the great majority of
lawsuits not yet begun, or, if begun, not yet tried. For, in
the great majority of such suits, the testimony will be oral
and conflicting. Often, too, it is unknown what trial judge
or jurors will hear the witnesses; the trial court's reaction
to the oral testimony (and the accompanying demeanor of
the witnesses) is then especially difficult to guess." But,
even when it is known who will be the trial judge or the
jurors, a prophesy of the future response of that trial judge,
or those jurors, to witnesses he or they have not yet seen
28 See references cited suPra note 17.
19 Even after the testimony is heard, that reaction is usually by no means
predictable.
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and heard is obviously, dubious. Here, then, is the source
of that "always present uncertainty" at which Cook cast
merely a footnoted side-glance.
It should be noted that this uncertainty-a trial court
(not an upper court) uncertainty-is present not only (as
Cook implied) when a case is to be tried by a jury, but
also when it is to be tried by a trial judge sitting without
a jury. I think it most important to make this point for
the reason that, like Cook, many -legal writers ascribe most
of litigation-uncertainty to the jury.
Cook on the "New Situation":
Cook's disregard of this "always present uncertainty,"
his relegation of it to a footnote, led him in his 1933 article
to set forth a thesis which underlies all his writings: Referring to the proper logical use of rules and principles,
he said that ".... life is continually developing and pre-

senting new and unexpected situations, and that these cannot just off-hand be treated as 'nothing but particular instances of defined classes.' "20
added: 21

Then Cook significantly

If all that is meant [by the quoted phrase] .. . is that
many of the cases which present themselves to a trial judge
are so much like other cases already passed upon that they
are disposed of in a more or less routine way without much
thought, the present writer has no disposition to disagree.
But cases of this kind do not require reflective thinking;
they are disposed of by habit. And of course by far the
larger proportion of situations to which the answer seems
clear never go to court at all unless the "facts" are in dispute. (Emphasis supplied.)

You see what that means: Cook maintained that, absent
a "new and unexpected situation," the existence of a dispute about the facts does not prevent the disposition of a
case "in a more or less routine way without much thought."
20 Cook, supra note 7, at 358. Emphasis supplied. Here he was quoting
Adler, Law and The Modern Mind: A Symposium, 31 CoL. L. R~v. 82, 106
(1931).
21
Cook, supra note 7, at 358 n.86.
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Someone may object that that statement was rather
casually made, and therefore does not reflect Cook's considered position. But he had previously, in a considered
manner, elaborated just that position in several other
papers. Thus in 1927, he wrote: 2 2
This past behavior of the judges can be described in
terms of certain generalizations which we call rules and
principles of law. If now the given situation appears to the
court as new, i.e., as one which calls for reflective thinking,
the lawyer ought to know . . . that his case is "new" because these rules and principles do not as yet cover the situation. If they did, the case would be disposed of ..
automatically. (Emphasis supplied.)
Again in one of Cook's last papers, published in 1943,2"
in which once more he quoted Dewey,2 4 he said that "previously worked-out generalizations-rules and principles-"
cannot "be automatically applied by mere logic to 'new'
situations," but that they do "enable us to dispose of
routine cases which do not require thought." He continued,
"And, fortunately, most situations with which we deal
throughout life do not present 'new' combinations; they
can be disposed of by mere habit." A "system of rules
and principles . .. "can be expected "to produce 'certainty'
and 'predictability' of decisions . . . in routine cases that
fit into the existing pattern without any real thought." They
"will give us the answer to the vast bulk of human transactions; only a small number will present new and unusual
aspects."
Cook's carefully considered view, then, comes to this: The
great majority of lawsuits "fit into existing patterns without real thought." 25 Only when, very occasionally, a suit
22 Cook, Scientific Method and the Law, 13 A. B. A. J. 303, 308 (1927).
I should add that Cook, unfortunately, tended at times to talk the language
of "behavioristic" psychology, as to which see FRANx, COURTS Ox TRIm 159-61
(1949).
23
Cook, An Unpublished Chapter, 37 IrL. L. REV. 418 (1943). See also
Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L. J. 457,
486-87 (1924).

HumAw

24

DE-wLa,

25

Cook, An Unpublished Chapter, 37 ILL. L. RFV. 418 (1943).

NATuRE AND CONDucr 244-45 (1922).
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presents a "situation" which is "new and unusual," in terms

of accepted legal rules--either because no rule covers it or
because new social conditions, or altered views of policy,
successfully press for a change in an old rule-does a trial
judge (according to Cook) need to resort to "reflective
thinking." Other cases, where solely "the 'facts' are in
dispute," and which present no rule-novelty, "are disposed
of in a more or less routine way" ("automatically"), by
"habit." In other words, ' legal uncertainty, says Cook, stems
almost entirely from those few unusual cases. There is
such uncertainty only because those cases involve "new and
unexpected situations" which do not nicely fit into these
rules. Decisions, then, Cook would have it, can easily be
predicted in any case where the sole dispute is as to the
existence of certain facts.
Had Cook been a consistent pragmatist, intent on basing
his theories on observation of actualities, he would have
visited trial courts to see whether, in cases where the facts
alone are in dispute, future trial court decisions can be
easily foretold. He would then have discovered the following: In most cases which "go to court," there is disagreement, not concerning the applicable legal rules but only
concerning the facts. Ordinarily, that fact-disagreement
means that, as I have said, the oral testimony of the several
witnesses is in conflict, so that the trial court-a trial judge
(in a jury-less case) or a jury-must (as, for instance, in the
two Alger Hiss trials) determine which part of the conflicting testimony should be accepted as reliable. This
ascertainment (or so-called "finding") of the facts, if properly performed, is by no means "routine," a mere matter
of "habit." Properly performed, it calls for much "thinking." When Cook states the contrary, he displays a surprising belief that only if the "thinking" relates to rules
and principles does it need effort.
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It is surprising that Cook should so evaluate "fact-finding," since he was peculiarly aware of the protean nature
of "facts," and of the way in which human attitudes go
into the very "making" of many things we call "facts." 2
When we look at the "external world," he wrote in 1937,
it: 2 7
presents itself to us as a shifting, varying series of changing patterns of color, sound, odor or what not [which may
be called] . . . "brute, raw events" . . . If we try to describe . . . these "brute, raw events," we discover ... that
there are an infinite number of aspects in any "situation,"
and that, in order to talk about it at all, we have to select
from among these infinitely varied aspects those which for
some reason or other we are going to talk about. In the
second place we discover that in talking about the selected
aspects we have to relate them in such a way as to put them
...

under some category, some class, for which we have (or perhaps create) a verbal symbol or name . . .In other words,
in making a "statement of fact" about the "given" situa-

tion . . . so as to state "what it is," I have in every case
necessarily selected certain aspects, thereby [bringing]
the selected "data" . .. under some category. Then and only

then can I say "what it is," that is, make a "statement of

fact."
The "facts," Cook concludes, "are the product first of 'abstraction' from the concreteness" of the "brute, raw events,"
and "then of interpretation of the elements abstracted...
What Cook Ignored:
When a court engages in fact-finding, there are presumably the same two steps. But, according to Cook, as I read
him, the first step-the initial "selection" from the "brute,
raw events"--a court always takes "automatically." Even
the second step-the "interpretation" of the "selected"
matter, the act of putting it under some legal category-is,
says Cook, taken by the court with no intellectual effort
26 I have discussed that subject at some length in Chapter XIV of my
book, FiANx, FATE AND FAouom (1945).
27 Cook, "Facts" and "Statements of Fact," 4 U. or Cm. L. REv. 233,
238-39 (1937).
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except in a few "unusual" cases. I think that Cook's account of judicial fact-finding is seriously inaccurate. As
appears from the following, Cook's account errs because the
"selections" are more numerous and complicated:
(1) The initial selection from the "brute, raw events"
is not made by the trial judge or the jury, but by the witnesses. For those events (for example, an assault or an
automobile accident) occurred in the past, and not in the
presence of the judge or jury. At the time of an event's
occurrence, the witnesses picked out some of its features.
What features they then picked out depended on their then
iespective capacities for correctly seeing, hearing, touching,
or smelling. It is common knowledge that many observers
are physiologically deficient in one or more of these capacities; accordingly, on that ground alone, the "selections,"
from the event, made by any one or all of the witnesses,
may have been seriously in error. In addition, emotional
factors, affecting the witnesses' attention, may have marred
those "selections." Moreover, the witnesses' subsequent
memories of those initial "selections" are often deficient,
due to physiological conditions, or to emotional factors,
including bias and prejudice. Also witnesses, when they
orally testify at a trial about their memories of their initial
"selections," again often distort their reports of those
memories; 2 8 they sometimes deliberately lie; more often
they distort because of bias. 9
(2) When, as is usually the case, the witnesses who
orally testify do not agree with one another as to their
respective "selections," the trial court must "select." That
is, the trial court must choose to believe one part of the
testimony rather than another, one witness instead of another. This choice by the trial court may be erroneous.
Trial judges or juries are themselves witnesses of the wit28 Sometimes they make mistakes through inadvertent errors in the words
they use in testifying. See FRANx, COuRTS ON TRIAL 18 (1949).
29 Id. at 18-20, 85-86.
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nesses. These witnesses of the witnesses may have been
inattentive when some of the testifying witnesses testified,
or may reject a testifying witnesses' testimony because of
an irrational bias against him. The trial court's fallible
"selection" of some part of the testifying witnesses' fallible
"selections" leads, then, to that court's determination
("finding") of a fact, i.e., its determination that some event
was a "fact" that actually occurred in the past.
(3) But a further selection may be necessary. All that
occurred--even assuming that it has been correctly ascertained by the trial court-may not be "relevant." That is,
some portion of the "facts" that are "found" may have
no bearing under any legal category (legal rule or principle)
which may be deemed pertinent in the case before the court.
From the trial court's "selection" of facts, there are culled
out, "selected," only those which are considered legally
"relevant."
Now Cook's discussion of the decisional process- in a
lawsuit relates exclusively to this last type of "selection."
Cook says nothing of the difficulties and uncertainties involved (a) in the witnesses' "selections" or (b) in the 'trial
court's "selection" from the witnesses' testimony (i.e., the
trial court's choice of witnesses to be trusted). Accordingly,
Cook leaves unexamined the most baffling and disturbing
components of the judicial decisional process.
An illustration will help. Suppose that, in a trial of a
lawsuit, some witnesses orally testify that Shadrach hit
Abednego on the nose, or that Miss Glamor wore a red hat on
a certain day; other witnesses testify exactly to the contrary. In determining whether Shadrach did hit Abednego,
or whether Miss Glamor did wear a red hat, the trial judge
or jury must select as correct the testimony of some witnesses in preference to that of others. The selection is
vsually final: If such a fact has any legal significance, and
if the case is appealed, the upper court will usually accept

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

that selection as true, and will not make its own "selection" from the conflicting oral testimony." In that sense,
it can be said that the facts are not "found." They are
"made"--by the trial court.
But it is another matter whether any fact so determined
("made")-through that sort of trial court selection-has
any legal significance. If the trial court's decision is appealed, the upper court may choose some of the facts thus
determined ("made") by the trial court, and disregard
other facts thus determined ("made"). The upper court
may say that a particular "fact" (e.g., that Miss Glamor
wore a red hat) is not "relevant" in this lawsuit 3 1 -that
is, that such a fact has no importance whatever under any
acceptable legal rule which bears on the decision of that
particular suit.
This determination of legal relevance, this legal categorization of "facts," is very different from the trial court's
selection of some oral testimony as a correct report of a
"fact"--such as that Shadrach hit Abednego. Facts of that
latter sort so "selected" by the trial court-and which the
upper court may or may not hold "relevant"--are "given"
to the upper court, are "data," for it-because the trial
court has already "selected" them with finality as to their
truth-has "found" them, as we usually (but inaccurately)
say. If, as is the case in most lawsuits, the facts thus
"given" slide easily into some established category, the upper
court's decision is virtually "automatic." A less automatic
process occurs in the upper court only when that court
30 For convenience, I assume throughout this discussion that the trial court
has committed no procedural errors, including inter alia the improper reception
or exclusion of evidence.
31 Whether her hat was red may be significant in some circumstances: Suppose that in a murder trial some witnesses, whom the trial court believes, testify that a woman wearing a red hat entered the apartment of the murdered man
a half hour before he was found dead. Whether Miss Glamor on that day wore
a red hat may, then, be significant as justifying the inferred fact that she was
the woman who entered the apartment.
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believes that the "given" facts present a "new situation"
calling for the creation of a new legal category.2
The foregoing may be illustrated as follows: Suppose
that Mr. Meek sues the Acme Auto Company, the manufacturer of an automobile which Meek bought from Tompkins, a dealer in Acme cars, Tompkins being an independent contractor and not an agent of the Acme Company.
At the trial, some witnesses testify that Meek's hip was
fractured when his car ran into a ditch as a result of the
breaking of the car's axle. Suppose that the trial court,
believing these witnesses, "finds" that such were the "facts,"
although other witnesses, whom the trial court does not
believe, testify that Meek was not hurt as a consequence
of that accident-that his hip was fractured when, in his
house, he slipped on a rug and fell. On appeal of Meek's
case, the facts, as determined ("found") by the trial court,
will probably be accepted as true. But, until 1916, the
upper court would have said that those facts lacked legal
significance, because of the then accepted legal rule that an
automobile manufacturer is not, in such circumstances, legally responsible to a man who bought his car not from the
manufacturer but from an independent dealer. However, beginning in 1916, 33 most upper courts changed that rule, and
held that the manufacturer, if careless in manufacturing
the car, would be liable to such a buyer. Through that
32 To render this discussion complete it would be necessary to discuss at
length (1) facts which a trial court infers from (2) facts which it has determined by selecting some testimony as true. Suffice it to say here that, on appeal,
ordinarily an upper court will accept as true any fact so inferred by the trial
court, if the inference was reasonable, although a different inference might
reasonably have been made. The drawing of such inferences corresponds roughly
to what Cook calls "interpretation" of the "facts." (Of course, even the facts
included in (2) are inferences.)
See Lavendar v. Kur, 327 U. S. 645, 66 S. ct. 232, 90 L. Ed. 916 (1945),

as to the acceptance by upper courts of both kinds of "fact" as determined by
trial courts. However, upper courts do not always, in all types of cases, accept
trial courts' inferred facts of the kinds included in (1). Moreover, an upper
court sometimes draws factual inferences of its own from the facts "found" by
a trial court.
33 McPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
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change in the legal rule, facts like those "found" in Meek's
case became "relevant." A court today will, without much
reflection, slide such facts (once they are "found") under
the new rule.
In sum, it is solely this sort of legal categorization of
"given" facts which Cook, and many other legal thinkers,
describe when they write of "facts" and "new situations"
or "usual situations." But Cook and those other thinkers
entirely, or almost entirely, ignore the earlier process of
selection by the trial courts of the facts, which usually become "given" facts for the upper court. Those thinkers,
that is, ignore the selection by the trial courts of some part
of the oral testimony as correctly depicting the past facts.
Consequently, those thinkers go seriously astray in saying
that, when a legal rule or principle is well settled-when
a court is sure to employ a previously contrived and accepted
legal category or rule-the decision will be so "routine,"
so much a product of "habit," that the court's decision is
easily predictable before any suit is commenced or before
any trial begins.
Summarizing what I have said up to this point, these
legal thinkers err in not observing the following distinction
in the functions of trial and upper courts: (1) A trial
court, in most cases, (a) must, by evaluating the stories
of the several witnesses, select "facts" from which (b) it
must then winnow out those that are the "relevant facts";
that is, by applying a proper legal rule to the whole batch
of facts which it has selected as the actual facts, the trial
court arrives at the legally relevant facts. (2) Generally,
an upper court does not engage in the first function-that
of evaluating the witnesses' credibility-but confines itself
to the second function, i.e., to deciding what facts ought
to be winnowed out as "relevant" in terms of the properly
applicable rule. Cook et al. deal with both trial and upper
courts as if both had solely the second function.
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More Detailed Description of Rule-Application-The Subjectivities Involved:
My description, thus far, of the trial court's function is
over-simplified. It is important to set forth more painstakingly how courts "apply" the rules.
(1) A legal rule is a conditional (or "if-then") formulation which seems to run like this: "If facts of a designated
kind occur, then these legal consequences should ensue."
(2) On that basis, seemingly a court, in a lawsuit, will enforce a particular rule whenever there have occurred specific facts of the kind designated by that rule. (3) But that
is not true. In a lawsuit it counts for nothing whatever
whether certain facts did or did not occur. The court will
enforce the rule if, and only if, it "finds" that those facts
occurred. (4) The trial court's "finding" is, at best, but
its belief about the belief of some of the witnesses as towhether those facts occurred.34 (5) The trial court, as
noted above, is itself a witness-a witness of what the witnesses say in the courtroom and of their demeanor while
saying it. The trial court forms its belief from thus witnessing the witnesses. The trial court-a jury or a trial
judge-is human and therefore, like any witness, may err
in its witnessing. (6) If the trial court, because it believes
erroneous testimony, believes that the facts occurred which
are necessary to invoke a particular rule, the trial court
(and the upper court, if there is an appeal) will enforce
that rule, although actually those facts never occurred.
(7) The facts, then, for the purpose of the court's decision
are not the actual facts but only the facts as thus judicially
determined, although that determination may be utterly
mistaken.
Even the foregoing is too superficial: (8) When a trial
court publishes a "finding," a determination, that some facts
34 The trial court's belief, of course, may be an inference from some of
the testimony, just as testimony is merely (1) a statement of (2) a witness'
memory of (3) his inferences as to (4) what he saw and heard.
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occurred, it is publishing-what? Merely a statement that
it believes those facts occurred. A "finding" is no more
than a report of that belief. That belief is subjective. Ordinarily, no one-including an upper court--can in any way
discover whether the trial court has honestly and accurately
reported its subjective belief.3 5 Wherefore an upper court
must accept the "finding" as an honest, accurate report of
that subjective belief. (9)
An upper court will usually
accept as the facts, from which the "relevant" facts are
culled, 8 the trial court's report of its subjective belief,
whenever there is some substantial oral testimony which, if
taken as true, will support that belief, although there is
other substantial oral testimony which, were it taken as
true, would render that belief unsupportable.
"The sovereign trial judge . . . may declare himself convinced [as to what are the facts] without saying why,"
writes Tourtoulon. "He may ignore competent witnesses
• . . -nevertheless his decision rests supreme." And Tourtoulon goes on to say that the judge:3 7
. . . is never obliged to state the real motives of his decision.
If he should make a rule that he would never decide between
contending parties except according to the lengths of their

noses, it would be easy for him to render judgments whose
reasonings were perfectly correct according to law and absolutely unassailable, and no one could ever suspect him of

the true motive which caused his decision.
On this basis, one might provisionally describe judicial
rule-enforcement as follows: A rule will be enforced by a
trial court's decision, and the decision will be affirmed on
appeal by an upper court, (a) if the trial court reports that
it has a (subjective) belief (called a "finding of facts") that
facts occurred which are of the kind designated in that
35 As to how trial judges may, and that sometimes trial judges (consciously or unconsciously) do, "fudge" their reports of their beliefs, see Frank,
Say It With Music, 61 HARv. L. R v. 921, 926-28 (1948); FRA.x, CouRTS oX
TRiAL168-70 (1949).
36 So far as they are relevant.
37 TouRTout x, PmwosoPry iN TH DEVELOPmeNT OF LAW 396, 550 (Read's
trans. 1922).
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rule, (b) provided only that the record contains some substantial oral testimony which, if taken as true, will justify
that belief, (c) although the record contains other substantial oral testimony which, were it taken as true, would show
that belief to be unjustifiable. The actual facts, as they
occurred, are entirely immaterial. Nor does it matter that
the trial court did not really believe the testimony necessary to support its belief, if the trial court (as it almost
always does in such a case) preserves silence as to that
disbelief.
What Makes a Case "Unusual"-The "Personal Bent" of
the TrialJudge:
Adopting for the moment this provisional description, it
is evident that Cook et al. overlook the following when
they speak of "usual" and "unusual" cases: In many a
lawsuit, there is some part of the oral. testimony which will
present an "unusual situation," if the trial court reports
that it believes that testimony. If, however, the trial court
reports (expressly or impliedly) that it did not believe that
part of the testimony, then, with that testimony accordingly
disregarded, the situation is one which the upper court will
treat as "usual." "Usualness" or "unusualness" is, then,
dependent on the trialcourt's report of its (subjective) belief
in one, rather than another, segment of the conflicting oral
testimony. (Repeatedly, the upper court of which I am a
member rejects as futile an appellant's argument that his
case is outside the usual rules-as it would have been if the
trial court's report had shown a belief in the testimony on
which the appellant relies.)
Dickinson (although perhaps not a Deweyite) joins Cook
in missing the point I have just made. On the "case-to-case
application of well-established rules," he writes:38
These personal characteristics of the judges may fairly
enough be said to have no appreciable influence. . . Rules
38

Dickinson, The Law Behind Law, 29 CoL. L. REv. 285, 308 (1929).
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like these possess well understood objective authority in such
sense that no competent judge, whatever his temperament
or intellectual equipment, feels that he has any choice about
giving effect to them.

The "personal bent" of the judge, says Dickinson, is a
factor only in "the selection of new rules for unprovided
cases." 11 True enough, when the facts are undisputed.
But when they are in dispute, and there is a conflict in the
crucial oral testimony, the "personal bent" of the trial
judge-his idiosyncratic reaction to the witnesses, to the
litigants and to the lawyers-frequently plays a controlling
role in his determination of the facts, i.e., in his subjective
belief about the facts (or his report of that belief). If,
because of this "personal bent," he so "finds" the facts that
a "well-established rule" is the only proper applicable rule,
that "personal bent" will nowhere appear in his findings, in
his written opinion, or in his decision; but it will have had
its effect nonetheless, although the case, as decided, will
not be an "unprovided case." If, however, he had so
"found" the facts-because of the way his "personal characteristics" were stimulated by the witnesses, etc.-that no
"well-established rule" applied, then there would have been
an "unprovided case."
I note in passing that, on account of this same curious
overlooking of fact-disputes, Dickinson (in concert with
many other legal writers) maintains that highly precise
legal rules prevent litigation; 4 0 whereas, in truth, thousands
of suits are brought yearly (auto accident cases are illustrative) where the pertinent legal rules are as precise as
rules can be, and where the decisions result from the trial
judges' or jurors' "personal characteristics" as they are
played upon by the events at the trial.
39 The phrase, "unprovided cases," which Dickinson uses to label what
Cook calls "new cases," was borrowed, I think, from the discussion by Continental lawyers of "gaps" in the "law."
40 See discussion in FPAsx, CouRTs ON TaZAL 52-53 (1949).
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Still More Details of Rule-Application:
My provisional description of rule-enforcement should be
enough, I think, to show up the weaknesses of the thesis
of Cook et al. But other weaknesses remain to be exposed.
For my provisional description is still too superficial. The
following must be added:
(1) Frequently, trial courts do not, in any manner,
state what facts they have "found," i.e., do not report their
beliefs (or purported beliefs) about the facts. Certainly
a jury does not do so when it returns a general verdict;
and, in many jurisdictions, many a trial judge often publishes neither findings of fact nor any explanation whatever
of the bases of his decisions, but merely enters laconic, unexplained judgments. In any such case, the upper court,
if there is an appeal, will, if the record evidence permits,
affirm the decision by assuming (without proof) that the
trial court made an unexpressed finding of fact-grounded
upon a belief in some part of the testimony supporting the
assumed finding-which will justify the decision under a
proper legal rule.41 So it is that many upper court opinions
say: "There was testimony from which the trial court could
reasonably have found that, etc." In any such case, for all
that anyone knows or can discover, the trial court had no
such finding or belief in mind. The assumed finding may
be the sheerest fiction (or myth). In those circumstances,
it is impossible to tell what legal rule, if any, was at work
in the trial court's decisional process.
(2) Moreover, at least sometimes, when a trial judge
does publicly report findings of fact, he did not begin his
thinking about the decision with those or with any other
findings: He began with a composite, unanalyzed, reaction
41 See, e.g., United Clay Products Co. v. Linder, 119 F. (2d) 456 (D. C.
Cir. 1941); National Surety Co. v. Lincoln County, Mont., 238 Fed. 705
(9th Cir. 1917); United States v. Standard Accident Co., 106 F. (2d) 200,
203 (7th Cir. 1939); Frayne v. Bahto, 137 N. J. L.. 109, 57 A. (2d) 520 (1948).
See discussion in FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 166-67 (1949).
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to the trial, a feeling, a "gestalt" or "hunch," that a particular decision would be just. He then worked backwards
to formulate findings of fact which, combined with an acceptable legal rule, would justify the decision he deemed
just. His "discretion" in choosing to believe some part of
the oral testimony (and to reject the rest) will usually protect his findings from attack on appeal, for those findings
will stand up if they comport with some of the testimony,4 2
since (as already noted) there is no way of discovering
whether or not he did believe that testimony.4" (I shall not
stop here to explain further the operations of the trial court's
"gestalt"; instead, I refer the reader to what I have said
of it elsewhere.4 4 )
The Out-of-Court Effect of Rules-Reliance on Precedents:
As I am here dealing with courts' use of the legal rules,
I put to one side the out-of-court effects of those rules, their
effects on "non-litigious" behavior. That is an important
subject regarding which I shall here say merely this: "
Men, it is often asserted, usually shape their conduct in
reliance on the legal rules. Gray and others suggest that
such reliance is less frequent than lawyers commonly assume.4 6 But sometimes some men do so rely; and the best
defense of the precedent system largely rests on the desirability of not disappointing their expectations." Now take
the case of a man who has acted in reliance on a particular,
well-settled, definite rule, trusting that, should litigation
arise, the court will apply that rule to his acts. If, however, litigation does arise, will the court apply that rule
to those acts? Yes, usually, if there is no dispute about
those acts. But if there is such a dispute, and if some wit42 Provided it was properly received in evidence.
43 See Frank, Say It With Music, 61 HARv. L. REv. 921, 925 (1948).
44 Ibid. See also Chapter XII, FRa x, CoUaTs ox TRIAL (1949).
45

See further, FRANK,

46 Id. at 268-69.
47 Id. at 268-70.

CouRTs ox TRIAL 268-69, 283-84, 327 (1949).
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nesses inaccurately testify orally concerning those acts, and
if the trial court mistakenly believes that inaccurate testimony, or expressly or impliedly " reports that it so believes,
then-what? Then the rule on which that man relied will
not be applied to those acts. Instances of such disappointed
reliance happen every day in our courts.49 Thus do trials
often play havoc with ,the precedent system.5
The "Unruly" Factorsin Trial Court Decisions:
In speaking of legal rules, I have been referring to the
so-called "substantive" rules. Of course, there are also
"procedural" rules, which, although called "subordinate,"
sometimes -

for instance, by excluding evidence -

have

marked effects on decisions. But those "procedural" rules,
no more than the "substantive," do not-cannot--control
such matters, influencing trial court decisions, as these: the
mistakes made by witnesses in their original observation of
the past events; the witnesses' mistakes of memory; their
biases and prejudices; the way in which lawyers, consciously and more often unconsciously, coach witnesses; the unconscious prejudices of trial judges or jurors for or against
witnesses, or litigants or lawyers. Those factors, being uncontrollable by rules, are "unruly." 51
Think, for example, of the "unruly" character of a trial
court's estimate of witness-credibility. As Maine said, no
rules can be devised to guide a trial judge "in drawing inferences from the assertion of a witness to the existence of
facts asserted by him ...

It is in the passage from the state-

ments of the witnesses to the inference that those statements are true that judicial inquiries generally break down."
It, he continues:52
48 "Impliedly" when it makes no findings and the upper court, as previously explained, assumes that the trial court so found the facts as to justify
its decision.
49 FRANY, COURTS ON TRIAL 327-29 (1949).
50 Id. at Chap. 11I.
51 Id. at Chap. VII.
52 MAnqp, The Theory of Evidence in VHLAGF-Comm!uNiis
295, 317-18
(1876).
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. .. is the rarest and highest personal accomplishment of a
judge to make allowance for the ignorance or timidity of
witnesses, and to see through the confident and plausible liar.
Nor can any general rules be laid down for the acquisition
of this power, which has methods of operation peculiar to
itself, and almost undefinable.

Wigmore has said repeatedly that there are no rules available to aid juries in giving probative value to the testimony
or any part of it." Since there are no such rules, the reactions to witnesses vary from trial judge to trial judge, from
jury to jury. The facts "found," after listening to witnesses,
by one. trial judge or jury may be quite different from those
which would be "found" by another trial judge or jury,
hearing the same witnesses.
Trials Are Off the Beat of Many Legal Thinkers:
That part of the judicial job which is peculiar to the
trial courts is obviously out of focus for those persons who
study solely the upper courts. Those persons therefore tend
erroneously to assume that the trial courts function as do
the upper courts. Thence came Cook's error. Trials were
off his beat--except insofar as they involved procedural
rules. He turned his back on all the "unruly" aspects of
trials. And so, too, do many other legal thinkers.
It would have been legitimate for Cook, in describing
the decisional process in a trial court, temporarily to omit
the (almost) "always present uncertainty" of trials, thereby
temporarily assimilating that process to that which goes on
in upper courts-provided he had later corrected his description by adding the omitted trial court uncertainty. But
that Cook never did.
Cook's attitude of indifference towards trials and trial
courts-an attitude unfortunately shared by many of our
leading legal thinkers, including some of the younger men
who are notably intrepid 5 4 -has helped to obscure the
53

See, e.g., 9 WIoMORE, EVIDENCE 503 (3d ed. 1940).
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I refer to Edward Levi and Felix Cohen, whom I shall briefly discuss

later.
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unique features of trial court decisions and their vast importance in their impact on the lives of our citizens when
they "go to law," as often they must. And that wholly
unpragmatic attitude is squarely opposed to all that Dewey
has written of the need to observe the relation of generalizations-rules and principles-to the actual goings-on of experience.
The Ambiguity of the Word "Fact":
Cook, in discussing "facts" (and I, in discussing Cook's
discussion) run into this trouble, a trouble met in thinking
or writing about "facts" in any field: The word "fact" is
ambiguous. It may mean, inter alia, one of the following:
(a) An event as it actually occurred, i.e., as, in all its
aspects, it would appear to omniscience;
(b) Those limited aspects of that event which human
beings-with their limited capacities-are capable of learning;
(c) Those still more limited aspects of that event which
some particular human beings did observe (accurately or
inaccurately);
(d) Some other human being's belief about (c);
(e) That limited, selected portion of (c) or (d) which
is regarded by some human being as pertinent ("relevant")
to some particular and restricted human purpose.5
Consider those divers meanings of "fact" with reference
to the "facts" of lawsuits: The witnesses, being human,
can never know (a). Ordinarily, they do not attain to (b)
but only to (c). We often speak, incorrectly, as if the trial
court's "facts" were (a) or (b) or (c). But the trial court
does not get as far as (c); it must content itself with (d).
Out of (d), it (or the upper court) carves (e).
55 The "facts,"

in that sense, are akin to theories.

FRANK, FATE AND FREEDOM (1945); see also Frank,

See

Chapter XIV,

The Place of the Expert in a

Democratic Society, 16 P-l. op ScIENCE 1, 5-14 (1949).
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Moreover, in speaking of courtroom "facts," we sometimes mean "background facts," i.e., the so-called social and
economic "data" of the sort used in the famous "Brandeis
briefs." Such "facts," usually of a statistical character, are,
of course, different from the kind of "fact" one means
when he speaks of the "fact" that Sloan ran over Pierce,
or the "fact" that Mrs. Rich was not of sound mind when
she mad& her will. However, contrary to common belief,
the "background" kind of "facts" is not free of subjec56
tivity.
2.

Professor Karl Llewellyn:
Llewellyn purports to be something of a Deweyite, as can
be seen in his occasional use of Deweyite terminology.
Llewellyn's failure to observe pragmatically how far his
theories about courts depart from much of judicial reality
is more striking than Cook's, because of Llewellyn's acknowledged steadfast refusal to study trial courts. That
refusal is the more strange since almost twenty years ago,
in 1930, he wrote in his important book, The Bramble
Bush: 17
Surely it is clear that I am damned out of my own mouth.
If, as I claim, what appellate judges do is vastly more important than what appellate judges say, that can only be
because importance to other people, to the laymen, to the
poor devils to whom they do it, appears to me the primary
measure of importance, and on that basis surely you should
ask me: how many people do appellate courts affect? For
a thousand cases appealed to the court of last resort there
are ten thousand which reach the intermediate court of review. For a thousand which reach the intermediate court
there are ten or twenty thousand which go wholly unappealed.
More; for a thousand cases on trial in the higher courts of
trial ...

there are again ten or twenty thousand settled finally

in some lesser court of trial: a small claims court, a municipal
court, the court of a magistrate or a justice of the peace. Here,
in this moving mountain of the cases unappealed, is the impact
56
57

See FRANx, CouRTs oN TRRiA 211-13 (1949).
Lv wEumx', THE BRAimm Busn 48, 89-91, 143 (1930).
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of the officials on society--even within the realm of litigation.. . By my own showing, on my own premises, these
are what count. I pass them by. Out of my own mouth I am
damned. .. Yet what can I do ... What records have I
of the work of magistrates? How shall I get them? Are
there any? And if there are, must I search them out myself? . . . There is excuse . . . there is reason, for fixing
attefntion on these upper courts. But is that excuse for
stopping with them? . . . Ignorance, accidents of experience,
favor, indolence, even corruption: how -much, how often,
when, and where? . . . Law is, to the community, what law
does. -What picture of the doing can you find in all this
study of appellate courts alone?

In that same book, LIewellyn told law students to "visit
the courts... not as spectators, but as students and critics";
and he wrote: "The man who sees line-play in the football
game is the man who once tried playing on the line himself.
A Harlem audience responds to niceties in tap-dancing you
do not even know are hard 'to do." In 1931, he complained
that legal scholars had neglected the trial courts, had succumbed to "the threat of the available," the material "available in libraries-the statute books and reports of uppercourt opinions." 58
That he had not taken his own advice and visited the
trial courts, as student and critic, probably explains an
astonishing statement he had made in 1929 about "facts."
He began this statement with the comment that:59
...the record of the facts [on appeal] is thrice distorted. The
story people tell in court may or may not reflect the actual
transaction. The rules of evidence, the procedural set-up of
the case, the presentation of the case in terms of lawyers'
theories, again twists the reflection of the true transaction.
And the statement of the facts by the appellate judge involves again their picking over, their reorganization, this time
in terms of so grouping, so phrasing them, as to make plausible the decision which the court has reached.
Llewellyn, Legal Tradition and Social Science Method in ESSAYS Ix RFScixmC s 89, 95-96 (1931).
59 Llewelyn, The Conditions for and the Aims and Methods for Legal
Research in HANDBOOE or Ass'N. or Aim. LAW Scroos 42-45 (1929).
58
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Then, amazingly, Llewellyn added, "For all this, the facts
break through in the record." 60 Now, on his own first
assumption, that last statement simply cannot be true:
When the witnesses' stories in court do not "reflect the
actual transaction," how can that "actual transaction" ever
"break through in the record"?
It is fairly obvious why Llewellyn wanted to believe that
unbelievable statement: Were it true, he would not need
to bother much about what happens in trial courts, since, by
merely reading the upper court record, he would know the
actual past facts.
In an article published in 1941,61 he said that "wherever
a rule is clear, and plainly wise, and plainly applicable...
it can be predicted" that a judge will follow it. The context shows that Llewellyn did not mean merely that, in
those circumstances, a judge will employ such a rule, but
that he meant that the judge's decision is easily to be foretold. Llewellyn qualified this remark by saying that "inquiry
into what there is . . . beside the rules, seems at first blush
to lead into all the vagaries of individual psychology and
so into hopeless additional complications." When I read
that remark, I thought that he was about to consider those
"vagaries of individual psychology" which affect a trial
judge's belief in some rather than other witnesses, and that
Llewellyn would then conclude that the resultant unpredictability of the trial judge's view of the facts, when oral
testimony is in conflict, often entails an inability to predict
the judge's decision, even when one can foresee what legal
rule the judge will use. I was wrong. Llewellyn said
nothing of such "complications" relative to the trial judge's
ascertainment of the facts. 2 Instead, he went on to demonstrate, to his own satisfaction, how differences of "individual
psychology," as between one judge and another, often
"prove to be the least vital part" in prophesying decisions.
60
61
62

Ibid.
See Llewellyn's essay in My Prmoso, y op LAw 183 (1941).
Or as to what I call the trial judge's "gestalt."
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I could point to remarks, in other articles by Llewellyn,
of similar character.13 Not long ago, in a conversation with
me, he defended himself on this ground: He should not
be criticized for not writing of trials and trial courts, for
he disclaims knowledge of that subject. Fair enough-if
in each of his writings he had made such a disclaimer, i.e.,
had said that he had confined himself to upper court doings.
But that he has not done. His intuitive genius had enabled
him occasionally to sense from second-hand information
(talks with trial lawyers) what many other legal thinkers
have overlooked as to the impact on legal certainty of trial
courts' methods of "finding" facts. But his flashes of intuitive perception can be no adequate substitute for personally
seeing, and participating in, actual trials. As I have said
elsewhere, Llewellyn resembles a color-blind artist attempting to paint the vivid colors of a sun-drenched autumn
landscape. 4 Since there is so much of legal practice of
which he is deliberately ignorant, his legal theorizing,
according to Dewey's precepts and his own, must have a
very limited value: Highly excellent on the upper court
level, it is remote from, and foggy in relation to, the largest
and most significant area of the judicial process.
3.

Professor Edwin Patterson:
For five years, Patterson and Dewey, at Columbia Law
School, jointly conducted a seminar entitled "Logical and
Ethical Problems of Law," based on "readings" which they
jointly prepared. In the foreword to Patterson's second
edition of his own book, An Introduction to Jurisprudence,
published in 1946, he acknowledges his indebtedness to his
"former colleague," Dewey, "for the sane guidance of his
philosophy." Here, then, we have a disciple of Dewey who
doubtless contributed to Dewey much of the latter's knowledge of matters legal.
63 See, e.g., Llewellyn, Counselling and Advocacy Especially in Comnercial
Transactions, 46 COL. L. RE,. 167 (1946); Llewellyn, On Reading and Using the
New Jurisprudence, 26 A. B. A. J. 418 (1940).
64 See FRANE, COURTS ON TRIAL 75-77 (1949).
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The ihfluence of Dewey on Patterson appears in Patterson's article, "Logic in the Law," published in 1942,65 an
article which to my mind is one of the ablest expositions
of that subject--on the upper court level. But it is in
Patterson's book, An Introductionto Jurisprudence,that he
has set forth extensively his notions of the judiciary. In
that book, which consists of 223 pages, all the passages,
scattered here and there, which treat of trials, trial courts,
trial judges, juries, witnesses and trial court "finding" of
fact, total up to about three pages.
The most revealing passage of that sort is the following: 66
In the 1920's one sometimes heard the sophisticated question, was X convicted of murdering Y because he did the
deed, or because certain witnesses swore that they saw X
run out with a smoking revolver from a room in which Y was
found shot to death by such a revolver? Such questions
imply cynical doubts as to the reliability of proof in some
cases, but do not deny that reliable knowledge of what X
did may be obtained by inference.

Now why does Patterson speak of such doubts as "cynical"? I suspect that the reason is this: He finds such
doubts unpleasant-and therefore wants to give a bad name
to the doubters. The truth is that usually a conviction of
murder does signify, at best,6 7 no more than that the trial
judge or jury did believe the testimony of some, rather than
other, witnesses. And the further truth is that those witnesses who were believed by the trial judge or jury may
have made mistakes in their observation of the events which
they reported in their testimony at the trial, or mistakes
in their recollections of their observations; or they may
have perjured themselves; or they may have been so prejudiced against the defendant that unconsciously they twisted
their testimony in a manner unfavorable to him.
65

90 U. OF PA. L. REv. 875 (1942).

ed. 1946).
I say "at best" because, thanks to the trial court's "sovereignty" and the
"gestalt," the decision may have been undiscoverably unrelated to the evidence.
66
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Borchard's important book, Convicting the Innocent,
published in 1932, should persuade any reader that such
mistakes, and perjury and prejudices, have often led to
wholly erroneous convictions. Moreover, in countless of
civil suits, like factors have led to decisions against men
who should have won their suits, decisions which have
brought about financial ruin to the losers. Patterson's characterization of the resultant doubts as "cynical" indicates
his unwillingness to explore the possibilities of inventing
detailed practices by which the number of such tragedies
may be substantially reduced-an unwillingness which,
almost surely, is related to his failure to study carefully
the trial courts. 8 Had he carefully studied them, he would
have learned much about non-rational factors in the decisional process which do not reveal themselves in upper
court opinions. His notion of legal logic would have been
far more circumspect.
In an article published in 1942, Patterson said:

9

The selectors with which the legal inquirer takes "facts"
from or through his sense stimuli, and by which he shapes
facts into the "operative facts" of the law, are derived not
alone from his previous legal experience and from his legal
education, but also from his total experience and from his

peculiar drives and preferences. No fixed legal categories
or concepts can wholly isolate this process of selection and
shaping; on the contrary, the influence of any inquirer's bio-

logical and social matrices is an inevitable limitation on the
"purity" of his reasoning. Hence the total personality of the
judge (or administrative adjudicator) can be a guaranty of
good government no less than the quality of the laws which
he seeks and purports to apply. An inquiry as to the prejudices, or ideals, of a prospective judge is thus no less relevant than an inquiry into his moral character or professional
competence. (Emphasis supplied.)
68 In 1947, Patterson noted that "American juristic theory during the past
three decades has concentrated upon the judicial process, especially the judicial
process of appellate courts. . . ." See Patterson, Pound's Theory of Social
Interests in INTaPRErATIoNs oF MoDE LECAL Pxmxosopnms 558, 567-68 (1947).
But he has not followed up that lead.
But he has not followed up that lead:
69 Patterson, Logic in the Law, 90 U. oF PA. L. REv. 875, 893 (1942).
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Patterson's reference to "biological" as well as "social"
matrices, and to a judge's "peculiar preferences and drives,"
seemed to mean that he fully recognized all the "subjective"
factors affecting decisions.
But, in a more recent publication, he apparently backs
away from such an approach, perhaps because his discussion of "jurisprudence" and of the judicial process almost
completely ignores the trial court. At any rate, in the 1946
edition of his book, in discussing the suggestion "that the
decisions of judges are influenced by individual personality
factors," we find him saying: "In its extreme form this
view predicated the importance of the judge's digestion
upon his decision. Since judges suffering from indigestion
do not have any uniform predilections, as far as I know,
this theory never got very far." For that reason, Patterson
goes on to consider "a more moderate view," i.e., "that a
judge's views on economic, moral and social questions influence his decisions." Patterson surmises that "judges are
influenced, in a good many cases, by their views on economic and social questions." But, he argues, these influences principally affect decisions relating to constitutional
issues which are "somewhat legislative in character" and
therefore "not typical of the judicial process as a whole";
moreover, he says, "even in such cases the influence of
political and economic beliefs is not wholly inescapable."
He concludes this discussion thus: "In private law cases,
the occasions when the judge's conservative or liberal political or economic views are determinative, seem much less
frequent." Let us probe Patterson's 1946 attitude:
(1) He says, in effect, that no inquiry into the influence
on decisions of judge's "individual personality factors" can
"get very far"-because those individual factors do not
reveal "any uniform predilections." You see his trouble?
He is looking for uniformities. If such an inquiry discloses-as it almost surely will-that uniformity is often
absent in trial judges' and jurors' reactions to conflicting
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oral testimony, Patterson apparently loses his interest in
the inquiry, shies away from it. Why? Because (as this
1946 treatise elsewhere discloses) Patterson regards a considerable amount of "generality" as an essential of a sound
and sane judicial process. Since such a study of un-uniform
trial court factors, which influence judicial "fact-finding"
especially, threatens to reveal un-uniformity (an absence of
"generality"), that study is distasteful to Patterson. It cannot "get very far"-except to disclose sources of considerable legal uncertainty. But should not a conscientious theorizer conclude that he is indeed "getting far" when he learns
that -the subject matter of his theorizing is not certain (as
he had assumed), but uncertain? It would seem imperative
for a Deweyite to know the real nature of what he is theorizing about.
(2) We may assume (and I happen to believe) that
Patterson is correct in saying that the influence of "political
and economic" beliefs, even in constitutional cases, is "not
wholly inescapable." We may also assume, arguendo, that
beliefs of that sort much less frequently influence decisions
in "private law cases." But precisely in "private law cases,"
individual trial judges, in "finding the facts," where the
testimony is oral and conflicting, are often affected by their
peculiar sub-threshold "preferences" and "prejudices" of a
kind that do not have a "political" or "economic" character,
and that are far less escapable.7
In passing, I note how cavalier is Patterson's method of
discussing those subliminal, non-rational, factors: He refers
solely to the influence of the judge's condition ("what the
judge had for breakfast") on his decision. Even that sort
of influence I think one should not laugh off: A trial judge's
dyspepsia or eupepsia may sometimes affect his attention
to the witnesses, and consequently his "fact-finding"--and
70 I shall not bother here to state again how those preferences and prejudices
may yield decisions which, undiscoverably,, are not related to the evidence.
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thus his decision." But forget the judge's alimentary canal.
Can one, if he is an accurate observer, ignore the trial
judge's prejudices (often unconscious) for or against particular witnesses-prejudices not caused by the state of his
digestion-on his conclusion as to what are the facts of the
case? "2

In one brief paragraph of his jurisprudence book,7 3 Patterson refers to the witnesses' selections made in the course
of their observations of events, and notes that these selections account for the "unreliability of the testimony of
witnesses." All he says, however, on that important subject
is that "the rules of judicial proof are designed to minimize
errors due to this 'subjective' element." But he gives no
explanation of how that aim is, or could be, achievedhow, for example, any rules can eliminate honest errors in
a witness' observations. Patterson then proceeds thus:
"From the narratives of lay witnesses' perceptions, the tribunal has to make further selections of those which have
legal relevance." Like Cook, he blithely glides over a kind
of "selection" by the trial court which is equally important
but more difficult to deal with: the "selection," as between
conflicting narratives of divers witnesses, of some part of
the testimony as a reliable reflection of the past facts as
they occurred, a "selection" which is clearly "subjective"
and often leads to errors that no "rules of judicial proof"
do or can minimize. Like Cook, Patterson depicts the trial
court's "selection" as one concerned solely with picking out
"relevant" facts, as if the "relevant" and "irrelevant" facts
were "given" to the trial court.
What Patterson and Cook overlook is this: When a trial
court believes mistaken testimony, the "facts" from which
it winnows out the "relevant facts" do not match the actual
facts. In those circumstances, the decision does not relate
See FRANK, COURTS ON TRiAL 162 (1949).
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to what actually happened, and injustice results. Injustice
also results when crucial evidence, which reflects the actual
facts, and which- the trial court might have believed, is not
brought into court, because the party whom that evidence
would have favored did not have sufficient funds to obtain
that evidence, i.e., could not afford (a) to pay an investigator to locate a missing witness or document or (b) to hire
a handwriting expert, a mining engineer or an accountant.7 4
Patterson's reference to "judicial proof" might have set
him to asking, with Wigniore, of what such proof consists.
Wigmore's huge volume on that subject m would have
taught Patterson, by a wealth of illustrations, that judicial
proof usualy means at best a trial judge's or jury's fallible
guess about the facts-a guess based (sometimes intelligently and sometimes not) on the trial judge's or jury's
reaction to the witnesses' fallible reports of their fallible
recollections of their fallible observations of the actual facts.
Wigmore, who began with the hope of discovering or inventing a "science" of judicial proof, confessed that, after many
years, he was forced to conclude that such a science was
unattainable, because of the ineluctable subjectivities involved in the course of proving facts in a courtroom.7"
The Relevance of the "Irrelevant":
How Patterson's concentration on "relevance," and his
neglect of subjectivity in the "selection" by the trial court
of some part of the conflicting oral testimony, narrow Patterson's vision of courtroom realities shows up in one of
his writings.7 7 There, referring to an article by Holmes, 78
74 FRANK, COURTS ON TRA 94-99; Frank, White Collar Justice, Sat. Ev.
Post, July 17, 1943, p. 22, col. 1; Frank, Book Review, 56 YALE L. J. 594
(1947).
75
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WIGuORE, PRINCIPLES OF JUDICIAL PROOp (1913).
See FRANK, COURTs ON TRIAL 49 (1949); FRANK, IF Mme WERE ANGELS

93-94 (1942).
77 Patterson, Book Review, 41 COL.
78 Holmes, The Path of the Law,
printed in HoLmEs, COLLECTED LEGAL
why a lawyer [in stating his case] does

L. REv. 562, 564 (1941).
10 HAlv. L. REv. 457, 458 (1897), rePA E'Rs 166, 167 (1920): "The reason
not mention that his client wore a white
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he says that "what the plaintiff was wearing," at the time
of the occurrence of past events in issue in a lawsuit, has
"no place in the courtroom, because 'the public force will
act in the same way'" no matter what "the plaintiff
wore." 79 Now had Patterson studied trials, he would have
known that, for failure (often intentional) of the opposing
lawyers to object,"° such "irrelevant" facts frequently do
get before the trial courts and do influence their decisions.
"Irrelevance," writes Judge Bok, an outstandingly able
trial judge, "can be highly enlightening." And he continues: 1
The witness who starts with what she had for breakfast
and remembers it was Thursday because her husband's sister
had come down with the measles when she shouldn't if she
had only gone to the doctor, the one with glasses-should
be a delight to the judge's heart and make the jury feel at
home. Behind this leisurely sweep of incident they can follow her as they please, and it will give them at least her
barometric pressure at the time when she signed the note at
the bank without reading it. After listening to enough of it,.
any idiot would know that she was an accommodation endorser who had done it to help her husband and had got
nothing out of it herself, but if the judge or jury are presented with a dry handful of disconnected facts they can't
be so sure.

Moreover, if Patterson had studied trials, he would have
noticed that, even if a plaintiff's attire in the past, before
the trial, may be unimportant, nevertheless the plaintiff's
appearance--sartorial or otherwise--at the trial, may subhat when he made a contract, while Mrs. Quickly would be sure to dwell upon it
along with the parcel gilt goblet and the sea-coal fire, is that he foresees that
the public force will act in the same way whatever his client had upon his head."
79 It may sometimes have "legal relevance," as in the case of Miss Glamor's
red hat, when some witnesses testify that they saw a woman wearing such a hat
near the scene of a murder.
s8o Most of the exclusionary rules are waived if not urged. An experienced
trial lawyer will often, in a jury trial, refrain from objecting to "inadmissible"
testimony because the objection may prejudice the jury against his client.
81 BoK, I Too, NIcODmEus 322 (1946). Compare this passage with the quotation from Holmes, supra note 78; and see Patterson, Logic in the Law, 90 U. oF
PA. L. Rxv. 875, 894 (1942): ". .. Mrs. Grundy on the witness stand will insist
upon telling many details which the judge and the lawyers regard as trivial."
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stantially affect the attitude of the jury or trial judge
toward the plaintiff's testimony. In terms of the legal rules,
that appearance lacks significance, i.e., is "irrelevant." But
when that appearance induces the trial judge or jury to
accept that testimony as true, it may influence the "finding"
of "facts," and consequently determine the decision. 2
Experienced trial lawyers do not disregard such factors.
But those factors are out of bounds in Patterson's "jurisprudence" which overlooks the "subjective" element in
trial courts' "selections" of the "facts."
Recalling Patterson's close association with Dewey, one
may surmise that Dewey's own failure (which I shall discuss later) to exploit more fruitfully, in respect of the
courts, his own notions of theory and practice, stems from
this: Patterson did not call Dewey's attention to trial courts
as invaluable judicial laboratories in which one can see for
himself the way in which legal rules and principles are
frequently frustrated through their application to mistakenly
"found" facts.
4.

Mr. Justice Cardozo:
Cardozo often cited Dewey. But like Cook, Llewellyn
and Patterson, he gave little heed in his extra-judicial writings to trial courts, because, perhaps, when at the bar he
had been principally an -appellate lawyer, and when on the
bench-except for a few months-an appellate judge. As I
have elsewhere tried to do so at length," I shall not here
tell how, because Cardozo was infected with appellate-courtitis, his description of the judicial process, superlative with
respect to upper courts, is astonishingly misdescriptive of the
much larger and more important part of that process which
goes on in the trial courts.
82 Or may yield a decision, I repeat, undiscoverably unrelated to the evidence.
83 Frank, Cardozo and the Upper-Court Myth, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB.
369 (1948).

NOTRE DAME LAWYER

Suits won or lost solely on the facts, where the legal rules
are clear, "make up the bulk of the business of the courts,"
said Cardozo. The decisions in those cases, he wrote, are
"important for the litigants concerned in them... But they
leave jurisprudence where it stood before." It "remains
untouched." "' In other words, for Cardozo "jurisprudence"
(i.e., legal theorizing) has no interest in the methods practiced in ascertaining the "facts" in the "bulk" of lawsuitsalthough avoidable defects in those methods may send innocent men to the chair or financially ruin others, through
judgments resulting from mistakes in fact-finding.
It is sometimes thought that Cardozo coined the phrase
"judicial process." He did not.84 What he did, alas, was
to use it so that (contrary to previous usage) it seemed to
denote nothing but the appellate court process. Consequently, he described "discretion" so as to exclude fact-discretion,
the distinctive "sovereignty" of the trial court.8 5
5.

Some Younger Legal Thinkers:
I said above that some of our younger and more intrepid
legal thinkers share Cook's unwillingness to study trials.
Consider, for example, Felix Cohen. He should not be classified as a devout -disciple of Dewey. However, in his remarkably fine paper, "Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach," published in 1935,8 Cohen cites Dewey
with some approval; and he accepts Holmes' "pragmatist"
position concerning legal rules.8" In that paper, he discusses
several ways of dealing with "facts." 88 But neither there,
nor (as far as I know) elsewhere, does he ever refer (1) to
the problem involved in a trial court's "selection" of what
are the "facts" from the conflicting "selections" made by
831
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84 Id. at 373 n.23.
85 Id. at 377-78.
86 35 COL. L. R-v. 809 (1935).
87 Id. at 827-28.
88 Id. at 829 et seq.
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the several disagreeing orally-testifying witnesses, or (2) to
the subjectivity of trial court fact-finding, or (3) to the
trial court's "gestalt." 89
In a more recent paper, ° Cohen says that some legal
thinkers "have denied that there can be any certainty or
objectivity in law, but the most energetic of these, upon
donning judicial robes, has had to profess an appeal to something more than the uncertainties of his own subjective
emotions when he has reversed the decision of a lower
court." In the first half of this sentence, Cohen writes of
the "certainty or objectivity" in "law," not in decisions;
and in the second half, when he does mention a deci-ion,
it is, significantly, that of an upper court judge, not that
of a trial court.
In this paper, Cohen correctly states that even in
"science" there is "subjectivism," because "there is a subjective element in judgments of fact, cold, light, color,
weight, pressure and everything else that is the object of
human experience," and because "no scientific statement
would have any meaning if it could not be tested -by such
subjective personal experience as our experiences of color,
pressure, etc." But, he says: 9
What saves science from being a planless succession of
day-dreams is that there are connections among our own and
other people's subjective experiences which are not always
too abstruse for human understanding. Consequently, men,
or at least some men, are able to think about, anticipate,
and make conscious use of a world beyond the egocentric
here-and-now. Such understanding and manipulation go beyond merely subjective impressions ....
True enough. The so-called "inter-subjective" impressions 92
often can be treated as "objective" facts, for practical pur89 See further discussion of Cohen in FRANx, CoTRTs oN
(1949).
90 Cohen, Book Review, 61 HARv. L. REv. 1469 (1949).
91 Id. at 1470.
92 See, e.g., FRANK, CouRTS oN TRiAL 189 (1949).

TIAL 148-50, 155
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poses, in science and elsewhere.9 3 But Cohen has never
faced the difficulty of applying that conclusion to fact-finding by trial courts: The varying subjective impressions
(1) of the witnesses and (2) of trial judges or jurors, since
those impressions are hopelessly "egocentric," cannot
be checked against one another in a way even remotely
like that used by scientists when testing their respective
subjective impressions." Many of the subjective impressions encountered in trials are therefore not "inter-subjective."
Although Cohen, in his writings, has several times quoted
Tourtoulon's book, Philosophy in the Development of Law,

I see no sign that Cohen's legal thinking has been affected
by the following cogent passages in that book:95
In order to apply the law to the fact, the judge ought to
substantiate the fact. He should substantiate material facts
often difficult to establish, and psychological facts almost impossible to investigate. Were there but one litigation to be decided in the whole course of existence, it is not at all certain
that the most clear-sighted man could gain a perfect knowledge of all the elements of the fact which he was to evaluate. But, taking into consideration the number of matters
which pass under his eyes, the most conscientious judge can
have only an extremely vague knowledge of each of them...
93 It should be noted, however, that there are several kinds of "subjectivity."
See FRANK, CouRTs oN TRIAL 187-88 (1949): "I have made much use of the
word 'subjectivity.' Disputations about 'subjectivity' and 'objectivity' are neverending. I cannot here discuss that subject at length, but I make these tentative
and elliptical suggestions. Man encounters at least five kinds of 'subjectivities':
(1) those which stem from the divers social heritages of divers social groups;
(2) those due to the grammatical structures of particular languages; (3) those
arising from physical location (Russell calls them 'physical' subjectivities);
(4) those which derive from the unique ('private') attitudes of particular persons; (5) those which inhere in the finite, limited, capacities of all human beings.
The first and second (which are related) can be eliminated to some considerable
extent, perhaps some day completely. The third has been successfully eliminated
in part by modern physicists (Einstein & Co.). The fourth would seem to be
largely unconquerable. The fifth, of course, will never be eradicated; one recalls
Bacon's statement that men are uniformly 'mad,' and Santayana's that all of us
are victims of 'normal madness.'" See also Frank, The Place of the Expert in a
DemocraticSociety, 16 PHIL. op ScIENcE 1 (1949).
94 See FRANK, FATE AND FPEnom 333-34 (1945).
95 See TouRTOULON, PmrXosopHY ix THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAw 395, 548, 556
(Read's trans. 1922).
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Juridical theory is more particularly represented by the law
school, and one who teaches there may. be considered as the
type of theorist. He acquires his knowledge of law by study,
reflection and criticism of the reflections of others. By the
study of cases and judicial decisions, he may descend from
the general to the particular; but he never knows the case
in all its details, he never has a human being explain himself to him and recount to him, with all the particulars, th
circumstances, of his dispute. He can only know what the
judge has retained and chosen,--a few fragments from a
bulky record..

. In reality; the judge may . . . by inexact

appraisements of the facts, always extricate himself from the
restraint of the law.9 6

Professor Edward Levi (educated at Yale Law School
where he imbibed pragmatist attitudes) has recently published An Introduction to Legal Reasoning,9 7 which is a
daring and penetrating exposition of judicial logic-but entirely on the upper court level. He maintains that "change
in the rules is the indispensable dynamic quality of law."
This change, he writes:9
.. occurs because the scope of a rule of law, and therefore
its meaning, depends upon a determination of what facts will
be similar to those present when the rule was first announced.
The finding of similarity or difference is the key step in the
legal process. . . The problem for the law is: When will
it be just to treat different cases as though they were the
same? A working legal system must therefore be willing
to pick out key similarities and to reason from them to the
justice of applying a common classification.

.

. The cate-

gories used in the legal process must be left ambiguous in
order to permit the infusion of new ideas. (Emphasis supplied.)

You see how he takes for granted that the facts of each
case are "given," and regards the court's task as solely that
of deciding "similarity or difference" in such "given" facts.
His valuable discussion of "legal reasoning" says nothing

of the trial court's ascertainment of what are the "facts,"
96 See also quotation from Tourtoulon, supra note 37.
97 Originally published in 15 U. or Cmi. L. Rav. S01 (1948).
98 LEv INTRoDucnTox To LEGAr. RFASOnNG 2 (1949). See further as to
Levi in Famxn, Comrs oN TRIAL 320-21 (1949).
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through its choice of one witnesses' story rather than that of
another; nor does he deign to mention the subjectivity of
the trial court's reaction to the witnesses, or the trial court's
"gestalt." 99
IV.
The "Unclassified Residuum"
William James once referred to the "unclassified residuum" consisting of "phenomena unclassified within the
system of ideas" prevalent in any particular field. To those
who adhere to such a prevailing idea-system, said James,
such phenomena are "paradoxical absurdities." If, James
continued, "there is anything which human history demonstrates it is the extreme slowness with which the ordinary
academic . . . mind acknowledges facts to exist which present themselves as wild facts, with no stall or pigeon-hole,
or as facts which threaten to break up the existing system." 100 So it is as to -the facts about trial court "facts."
The existing system of ideas about the courts, a system
dear to the Deweyites, contains no stall for these "wild
facts."
It is true that, in the writings of the Deweyites, and of
some other legal thinkers largely devoted to that system,
one will discover, here and there, hints about the effects of
uncertainties in trial court operations.' ° But of such hints
99 Levi quotes Aristotle but does not refer to Aristotle's elaborate discussion,
in the Rhetoric, of the effect of emotional appeals on court's decisions, a discussion which I shall consider later.
100 JAims, ThE WILL To BELiE 299-300 (1897).
101 Interesting here is Thomas Reed Powell. In 1922, discussing upper
court decisions, he said: "I have the glimmering of an idea which I cannot
express, that what is settled [by any such decision] is not what we assume it
to be. Every decision of an appellate court is a judgment on' a hypothetical
state of facts. The judge no longer cares what is really so. He is interested
only in what appears on the face of the record from the trial court. We have
an elaborate and in many respects an artificial mechanism for transmitting the
deeds of man into printed record. In so far as the process of transmutation
conforms to the required procedure, the record is final for the purpose of the
law. But it remains at best a hypothesis. The further issues raised by the
hypothesis may be said to be settled when they are finally passed by the court
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one can say what Carl Becker said of the idea of "evolution" in Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws: 0 2
Very true it is that the idea was there in his own manuscript. But the significant thing is that Montesquieu made
little use of it, that no one (Leibnitz excepted) made much

use of it. The idea was present in the eighteenth century,
but no one made it welcome; it wandered forlornly about in
the fringes of consciousness, but it never really got across.

To put it somewhat differently: Many legal thinkers seal
off (a) whatever thinking they do about trial court realities
from (b) their thinking about the judicial process in general.
The case of Roscoe Pound is here especially noteworthy:
(1) More shrewdly and correctly than the legal Deweyites,
he has written of the way the "personal element" in trial
judges' decisional processes interferes with the supposed and
outward-appearing certainty in the application of legal
rules.10 3 He has, indeed, lauded trial by jury just because
jurors are able to, and often do, pay no attention to the
legal rules which the trial judges tell them they -must
apply."0 " (2) Yet Pound has repeatedly said (with loud
applause from many other legal writers) that, in litigation
concerning "property" or "commercial transactions," legal
certainty prevails since (says Pound) decisions in such suits
not only should but do strictly conform to precise legal
rules. 105
Those two themes are irreconcilable. In litigation involving "property" or "commercial transactions," as in other
above. There is an actual solution of a hypothetical issue. Some one must pay
money or go to jail because of an opinion on an assumed set of facts." Powell,
How Philosophers May Be Usefl to Society, 31 INT. J. or ETmIcs 289, 298
(1922). However, Powell never sedulously followed up that "glimmering of an
idea."
102

BECKER, THE HEAVENLY

Crry or THE EIGHTEENTH

CENTURY PHIL-

osoPHERs 97 (1932).
103 See Pound's writings cited and quoted in FRAx, IF MEN WERE ANGELS
341-45 (1942), and in FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN Mnm 208-16 (1930).
104 Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. REv. 12, 18-19
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kinds of litigation, trial courts (whether jurors or trial
judges in non-jury cases) often believe (or, expressly or
impliedly,'016 report that they believe) perjurious or otherwise erroneous testimony about the facts.' 1 No less in such
lawsuits than in others are jurors heedless of the legal rules.
How, then, can it be said that in this particular type of
lawsuits the "personal element" is inoperative and does not
yield uncertainty in the decisions? Pound here has walled
off his shrewd observations of trial court uncertainties from
the balance of his legal thinking. The result is most misleading.
When discussing legal certainty in any sort of litigation,
it is seriously misdescriptive to describe merely the certainty of the legal rules the courts employ and to neglect
to state that such rule-certaintymay well have no correlation with decision-certainty. Men who invest in "property,"
and who are advised that certainty in the legal rules protect them, should litigation arise, will be little solaced when
they lose their investments through court decisions based
on trial court's mistakes of fact or which result from juries'
failure to follow trial judges' instructions about the rules.108
Even more acutely than Pound have Maine 109 and Tourtoulon 110 perceived the vagaries and baffling uncertainties
of trial court "fact-finding." But they, too, have so compartmented that subject that the major part of their legal
writings is unaffected by it.
106 See my earlier discussion as to "impliedly."
If anyone thinks that the parol evidence rule can prevent the legitimate
introduction of oral testimony in such cases, he should read Cotbin, The Parol
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Distorted Views of Legal Certainty and Uncertainty:
The best way to measure legal certainty is to consider
a well-trained lawyer's ability to tell his client how a court
will decide a lawsuit. Most legal thinkers (including the
four legal Deweyites, Cook, Llewellyn, Patterson and Cardozo) grossly over-estimate the quantum of legal certainty,
because they have not recognized that the lawyer's guessingpower varies with the stage at which his forecast is requested. Let us take the case of a question about a future
court decision relative to a contract:
(1) When the client, having just signed a contract, asks
what are his legal rights pursuant thereto, at that time
neither the client nor the other party to the contract has
as yet taken any steps under the contract. The lawyer's
prediction at this stage must include a hazardous guess as
to what each of the parties will do or not do in the future.
The prediction must frequently be so full of if's as to be
of little practical value.
(2)
After events have occurred which give rise to
threatened litigation, the client may inquire concerning the
outcome of the suit, if one should be brought.
(a)
Before the lawyer has interviewed prospective witnesses, his guess is on a shaky foundation.
(b)
After interviewing them, his guess is somewhat less
shaky. But unless the facts are certain to be agreed
upon, the guess is still highly dubious. For, if (as
is usual) the witnesses are to testify orally and
will disagree about what they saw and heard, seldom can anyone guess how the trial judge or jury
will react to the testimony."' Especially is the
guessing at large, if the lawyer does not know
what trial judge will sit, should the trial be juryless; it is still more so, if the trial be by jury, since
the lawyer cannot know what persons will be the

jurors.
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(3) After the trial, but before decision, the lawyer's
prophesy may be somewhat better, for he is now guessing
the reaction to the testimony11 of a known trial judge or
jury observed in action in the particular case. Yet-that
guessing is often none too easy, even so.
(4) After trial and judgment by the trial court, the
guess relates to the outcome of an appeal, should one be
taken. It therefore usually relates solely to the rules the
upper court will apply to the facts already "found" by the
trial judge or jury. At -this stage, a competent, trained
lawyer can often predict with accuracy. Only this last prediction situation, no others, do most legal thinkers discuss.
Surely such discussion is altogether too restricted. And
surely those interested in the judicial process ought not to
disregard such non-rule factors, producing uncertainties in
decisions, as, inter alia, the following: perjured witnesses,
coached witnesses, biased witnesses, witnesses mistaken in
their observation of the facts as to which they testify or
in their memory of their observations, missing or dead witnesses, missing or destroyed documents, crooked lawyers,"'
stupid lawyers, stupid jurors, prejudiced jurors, inattentive
jurors, trial judges who are stupid or bigoted or biased or
"fixed" or inattentive to the testimony. Nor ought humane
men ignore the fact that a party may lose a suit he should
win because, in preparation for trial, he cannot afford to
hire a detective, an engineer, an accountant, or a handwriting expert."14 Are judges and lawyers to give no heed
to such matters, and, because of such heedlessness, to do
nothing to improve, so far as practicable, the methods of
fact-finding in trial courts?
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Moral Irresponsibilityof the Arm-Chair Jurists:
Because many modern writers on legal theory have seldom, if ever, practiced in trial courts,"'5 they resemble the
Roman jurisconsults (during the closing days of the Republic and up to the time of Diocletian). Those jurisconsults,
who gave legal opinions based upon hypothetical statements
of facts, looked down upon the practicing advocates (the
"orators") who tried lawsuits."' Yet it was not these
arm-chair theoretical jurists but the advocates-like Cicero
-who, using the tools of their craft, appeared in court and
won (or lost) the suits, and whose activities thus vitally
affected the fate of litigants. Cicero, for instance, boasted
that he had cast dust in the eyes of the jury in the case
of Cluentius. But the jurisconsults did not care whether,
by such or other means, innocent men were convicted or
guilty men escaped. The modem "jurisconsults"-Cook,
Patterson, Llewellyn, et al.-like their Roman predecessors,
pay no attention to the way in which the trial courts reach
their determinations of fact, although the decisions, both
of trial and appellate courts, often depend on those determinations.
There is a moral irresponsibility in this aloofness. from
practice. To the legal Deweyites, and many other legal
thinkers, there might be applied these words of Dewey:" 7
Ends separated from means are either" sentimental indulgences or if they happen to exist are merely accidental...
Construction of ideals in general and their sentimental glorification are easy; the responsibilities both of studious thought
and of action are shirked. Persons having the advantage
of positions of leisure and who find pleasure in abstract
theorizing ... have a large measure of liability for a cultivated diffusion of ideals and aims that are separated from
the conditions which are the means of actualization.
Cardozo is only an apparent exception.
116 See, e.g., ScHULz, HISTORY op Rom" LrE.
ScIxmC
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117 Dzwxy, THE QuEsT FOR CERTAINTy 279, 281-82 (1929).
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Trial Court Mistakes Frustrate Ideals:
Legal rules, if well-contrived, embody important social
policies and moral ideals. But those policies and ideals are
not actualized when, due to a mistake in fact-finding, such
legal rules are applied to facts that never happened. Some
of those mistakes could be prevented through improvements
in our method of trying cases and in the education of future
trial judges. But the improvements in rule-techniques to
which the legal Deweyites are obsessively devoted will not
prevent the tragedies resulting from avoidable trial court
mistakes in ascertaining facts. When a court applies an
impeccable rule to non-existent facts-as when it sends a
man to jail for a theft he did not commit, or when it enters
a huge money judgment against a defendant who, in actual
fact, did the plaintiff no harm-the court's performance resembles that of a surgeon who, because of mistaken identity, uses perfect surgical techniques to cut off the leg or
to remove the stomach of a healthy patient. Those who
profess to be interested in the health of our citizens would
be alert to prevent such surgical blunders if they were likely
often to occur. But most of the legal Deweyites have been
indifferent to equivalent judicial blunders. Those men have
sentimentally glorified the ideals and shirked the action
necessary to realize those ideaqs.

Two-Dimensional Legal Thinking:
As I have elsewhere suggested, 18 legal thinking which
disregards trials is flat, two-dimensional; in such thinking,
what goes on in the third dimension is out of sight and
therefore out of mind; only when trials are included does
the thinking become, more accurately, three-dimensional." 9
The legal Deweyites portray (with much fidelity, to be sure)
a two-dimensional judicial world alone. That disciples of
Dewey should so narrow their studies is truly remarkable.
118 See preface to sixth printing, pp. ix-x, FRAwX, LAW AND THE MODER
MmD (1930); FRANx, CouRTs ON TRai. 74, 198 (1949).
119 Perhaps inclusion of the trial court's gestalt may be said to add a fourth
dimension;
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The Scorn of "Wild Facts" About Courts:
If these men were true followers of Dewey, they would
be constantly on the lookout for the "wild facts" about
courthouse government which cast doubt on their theories.
For Dewey has said: 12 0
. . . the primary value of hypotheses and theories is found
in their power to direct observation to discovery of newly
observed facts and in their power to organize facts in such
a way as to forward the solution of a problem. .. What a
scientist asks of his hypotheses is that they be fruitful in
giving direction to his observations and reasonings. Confrontation with an observed fact which does not square
with a hypothesis is consequently just as welcome as one
which does-since it enables him to introduce modifications
into his idea that renders the latter more efficient in future
conduct of inquiry. . . In science, discovery of an exception, of a fact that contradicts a theory in the form in which
it has been previously held, is a positive means of advance.
It is not only welcome when hit upon but is actively searched
for.
A convinced legal Deweyite would not, like Cook, shove off
into a footnote the "always present uncertainty of trials";
or, like Llewellyn, refuse to visit trial courts; or, like Patterson, depict as "cynical" any reference to doubts about
trial court mistakes in fact-finding; or like Cardozo, ignore
the trial courts' "fact-discretion" and say that tragic factblunders are of no interest to the Student of "jurispru-

dence."
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Now let us look at Dewey's writings to see whether, vis
a vis the courts, he has been wiser than his legal disciples.

(To be concluded*)
Jerome Frank
120 DsvLy, Experience, Knowledge and Value: A Rejoinder in I THE
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121 See Frank, Cardozo and the Upper-Court Myth, 13 LAw & CoNTEum.
PEoB. 370, 376-78, 381, 385-86 (1948).
*Part II of this article will appear in the Spring issue of The Notre Dame
Lawyer.

